Archives: Election Hub

Get ready to engage in a series of policies coming from the EU to ensure that the European markets respond to your business needs when it comes to reducing regulatory burdens and achieving a more business-friendly landscape. The first legislative proposals are dropping on 26 February 2025!

On 29 January 2025, the European Commission published its Competitiveness Compass, a major strategy aimed at boosting Europe’s economic strength, reducing regulatory burdens, and reinforcing its global competitiveness. The plan, promised by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, builds on the Draghi Report’s recommendations, calling for urgent action to address Europe’s productivity gap, investment challenges, and economic dependencies. The Compass calls for stimulating innovation, streamlining regulations, and reinforcing Europe’s industrial and technological leadership. The end goal is to ensure that the EU remains competitive, while maintaining its commitments on sustainability and digital transformation.

The Competitiveness Compass is structured around three key priorities:

• Closing the innovation gap through better support for start-ups, venture capital, and R&D investment;
• Ensuring industrial decarbonisation aligns with economic policies, supporting clean technology and sustainable manufacturing;
• Strengthening Europe’s strategic autonomy by securing supply chains, reducing reliance on third-country suppliers, and ensuring access to critical raw materials.

To achieve these objectives, the European Commission has signalled it will introduce simplification measures, will increase efforts to integrate the Single Market, improve financing access for businesses, and will improve policy coordination between Member States.

For businesses, the Competitiveness Compass brings the hope of reduced red-tape, better access to finance and streamlined compliance procedures. However, achieving this goal will require businesses to speak-up and help shape the policies to ensure that policy ambition is matched with market reality.

With the first legislative proposals dropping on 26 February 2025, Europe’s businesses will need to be prepared to respond to and get involved in consultations, while tweaking their operational strategies to stay ahead. This is a chance to shape the rules, cut through the red tape, and turn policy shifts into new growth opportunities. The regulatory landscape is evolving, make sure you’re ready to move with it!

Here is our highlight of some of the flagship policies broken down by sector (please note all dates provided hereunder are subject to change):

Agri-food: the EU is working toward a long-term Vision for Agriculture and Food Production – setting vision for 2040 and guiding EU action as well as the reform of the Common Agriculture Policy. Accounting for around a third of the EU’s budget, CAP reform is no small task! This communication will need to balance competitiveness and sustainability, while also supporting food security and the resilience and profitability of farming as a profession. The leaked document suggests that farmers are not favoured for additional funds to support the yield losses they will need to bear from using less pesticides. Rather, it seems the EU may put measures in place that would squeeze the agrifood value chain margins, with consumers possibly paying the price.

With the push for organic and agroecological farming being coupled with the much awaited Bioeconomy Strategy and an underlying assumption that organic is safer, agrochemical companies will have an interest in defending the reputation of their technologies. They may want to also ensure that the EU understands that organic doesn’t always mean safer or better. Agri-food players will have an interest in ensuring that the EU also understands the compromises in efficacy and yields and therefore the potential implications for the EU’s food imports.

The Biotech Act covering genetically modified crops grown for human consumption and animal feed as well as their import, is finally coming. With pressure to ensure that the same standards apply to imported crops as those grown in Europe, this piece of legislation will have far reaching implications including for Brazilian growers exporting GMO soybean into Europe as well as agrochemical, seed and value chain players. It will also cover bio-based fertilisers.

Chemicals: the fundamental pillar of the EU’s chemicals legislation, REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals) Regulation, is being revised! The Commission will make a proposal this year and is expected to streamline chemical safety assessments and improve decision-making on hazardous substances. Questions remain over how it will balance consumer safety, environmental protection, and industry competitiveness and if ideological motives will prevail over market considerations. With REACH regulating the manufacturing and management of the use of chemicals, this will have a far-reaching affect from the ingredients used in paint to those used in cleaning products and pesticides. Will the EU become even more engrained in its hazard-based approach, or will it allow science to guide the level of exposure that would pose a risk to health?

Defence: the European Commission and the European External Action Service are preparing a White Paper on the Future of European Defence. The EU has been stepping up its work on defence by releasing the first ever European Defence Industrial Strategy in March last year, having its first-ever Commissioner for Defence and Space (Andrius Kubilius) and with the European Parliament’s subcommittee on Security and Defence having been upgraded to a stand-alone Committee. If it will yield a European Defence Union and the procurement rules that will be accompanied are yet to be seen. Given the proposed allocation of €1.5 billion from the EU budget until 2027 that’s already on the table, the way the Competitiveness Compass directs EU efforts to enhance industrial capacity, establish a Single Market for defence, and improve SME access to finance will be crucial. As the EU strives to create a European defence industry, it will need to balance ambition with the willingness of Member States to play ball.

Energy: the Affordable Energy Action Plan, set for Q1 2025, will introduce measures to increase access to low-cost energy for households and industrial consumers, ensuring energy affordability while supporting the EU’s green transition. Additionally, the Electrification Action Plan and European Grids Package, expected in Q1 2026, will focus on expanding and modernising electricity grids to accommodate increased demand for renewable energy, storage solutions, and cross-border electricity trade. These efforts will be complemented by the New State Aid Framework, due in Q2 2025, which aims to facilitate investment in clean energy projects and industrial decarbonisation. The private sector will want to keep a close eye on which technologies will come out on top as being considered as greener.

Environment: the Clean Industrial Deal is expected to be the first announcement and will come at the end of this month. For all those companies who have said their innovations can help drive a more sustainable Europe – this one is for you! And if you feel that the sustainability contributions of your innovations and products are not being sufficiently understood, now is your time to speak up and explain. This piece of legislation aims to enhance the competitiveness of Europe’s net-zero industries while expanding manufacturing capacity for green technologies, from hydrogen and chemicals to biotech and nanotech. It is expected to announce financial support while also enabling clean trade relations. It is yet to be seen if it will genuinely enable Europe to lead the clean-tech race. Especially given that other global markets like the USA, China and India are already leading with massive investments in clean technology and less regulatory barriers. Also, how the deal balances a pro-industry and pro-trade approach with environmental considerations will determine if it enhances or curtails EU markets.

The Circular Economy Act, set for Q4 2026, is expected to focus on investment in recycling capacity, encourage the substitution of virgin materials with secondary raw materials, and reduce landfilling and incineration. This will be accompanied by the rollout of eco-design requirements for key consumer products, and should align with existing legislation including the heavily-lobbied Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation, as well as the Waste Framework Directive, which is currently undergoing inter-institutional negotiations. The pressure will be on the Commission to stick to its promise of less regulation for businesses, whilst also reducing Europe’s reliance on third countries especially when it comes to the market for waste and secondary raw materials. It is yet to be seen how the EU will balance ambition with realism and the financial incentives that will be introduced to support the way circular economy principles are brought to life.

Health: the emergencies brought on by the Covid-19 had a profound impact on health policymaking during the previous mandate, with the establishment of HERA and a key revision of the Pharmaceutical Legislation kicking off with aplomb. This new mandate seeks to take things a step further and has promised to deliver a Critical Medicines Act within 100 days of taking office. The Act, which will in large part take notes from the work of the Critical Medicines Alliance, which is currently finalising its strategic report. In this sense we can expect the act to focus on securing supply chains for key medicines, reducing dependencies, and addressing certain market failures to avoid the shortages which were felt at the height of the pandemic. This will include measures to strengthen Europe’s pharmaceutical production capacity and reduce reliance on non-EU suppliers, especially for API manufacturing and generic medicines production. Later during this mandate, with a view to bolstering of its leading sectors and key area of expertise, the Commission is expected to put forward a European Biotech Act in 2026. Together with the EU Bioeconomy Strategy – which will focus on expanding the bioeconomy market – the Biotech Act will provide a framework for health technology assessment and clinical trials for biomedicines.

Tech and digital: 2025 will be a landmark year for this space, with the Apply AI and Data Union strategies planned for Q3, and the Digital Network Act for Q4. ‘Apply AI’ will seek to boost new industrial uses of AI in key sectors including manufacturing, energy, pharmaceuticals, and financial services. The Data Union will facilitate the secure sharing of private and public data, which will help bring AI applications to life. The Digital Networks Act will aim to create the market and regulatory conditions necessary for the Union to update its digital and telecommunications infrastructure to improve connectivity for end-users and ensure European companies have the framework necessary to close the innovation gap. In parallel, this year the Commission will also seek to build on one of Europe’s core industrial strengths, building on the success of the Chips Act, the Quantum Strategy and Quantum Act (planned for Q2 & Q4, respectively) will address regulatory fragmentation and support further investment in European quantum computing to help better leverage the opportunities afforded by new tech.

Transport: a Sustainable Transport Investment Plan, expected in Q3 2025, will introduce measures to support investment in charging infrastructure and the production and distribution of renewable and low-carbon transport fuels, eagerly expected by hard to abate sectors like shipping and aviation. These efforts aim to accelerate the transition to greener transport, while ensuring affordability and accessibility. Additionally, the Industrial Action Plan for the Automotive Sector, set for Q1 2025, is expected to propose supply and demand-side incentives, including measures to encourage the greening of corporate fleets and a potential EU-wide subsidy scheme to improve competitiveness in the sector. The ongoing Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the Automotive Industry will certainly feed into this initiative, although heated debates are taking place on whether to amend the current emissions standards for cars and vans (particularly the targets and penalties for 2025). Finally, expectations are high from both industry and citizens for the Commission to deliver on its flagship rail initiatives, namely the consolidation of European high-speed network and Single Digital Booking and Ticketing Regulation.

By Marc Planas & Charles Patterson | Brussels, European Union

During the Plenary Session held last week (20-23 January), the European Parliament announced the much awaited composition of four new committees: the upgraded Committees on Public Health (SANT) and Security and Defence (SEDE), as well as two special committees to deal with housing (HOUS) and the so-called ‘Democracy Shield’ (EUDS). This announcement follows the vote in late 2024 which officially created the committees, following the recommendation by the EP’s Conference of Presidents.

The committees of the European Parliament play a key role in shaping the institution’s stance on legislative proposals. They draft positions, prepare own-initiative reports, host expert hearings, and oversee the activities of other EU institutions and bodies, among other responsibilities. Following these changes, the Parliament will now operate 22 fully-fledged committees, two subcommittees (whose work is overseen by a ‘parent standing committee), and two special committees. Many of these committees will be chaired by members of the centre-right EPP group, the largest political group in the EP.

Defence and health in the spotlight to address key challenges

With this reform, both SEDE and SANT will cease to be subordinate to their ‘parent’ committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), respectively. These will see their mandates adapted to reflect the new changes.

The decision to establish a committee on defence highlights the urgency of strengthening Europe’s security architecture in light of Donald Trump’s return to the White House and an uncertain outcome for the war in Ukraine. SEDE has taken on an expanded mandate to address critical aspects of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and related defence-focused initiatives. This includes overseeing threats to the EU’s territorial integrity, managing civilian and military common EU missions outside its borders, and framing a unified defence policy among Member States, among others. The committee will also be tasked with monitoring and implementing defence research, fostering innovation and joint production, addressing hybrid threats, enhancing Europe’s defence industry and cyber-defence capabilities, an advancing military mobility infrastructure. The upgrade also comes shortly after the nomination of the very first European Commissioner for Defence, Andrius Kubilius.

Likewise, SANT’s upgrade follows extensive work by the European Parliament in the previous legislature to be more involved in health matters in reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the work carried out by the former special committee on Beating Cancer (BECA). To wit, SANT will focus on key areas such as pharmaceutical products, medical devices, public health programmes, and preparedness for health crises. The EPP had strongly advocated for strengthening the SANT subcommittee to bring greater attention to health-related issues, which they argued were being overshadowed within the broader Environment Committee.

The move to establish SEDE and SANT as standing committees was not without controversy, however, as their new and expanded roles were met with some scrutiny and resistance from other political groups. Members of ENVI in particular expressed concerns that separating health issues from environmental matters could undermine the cross-sectoral approach to public health. As a compromise, food security and animal welfare will remain under the Environment Committee, which will be renamed the Environment, Climate, and Food Safety Committee.

Special committees to meet new challenges: foreign interference and rising home prices

The European Parliament also decided to set up two special committees on the ‘European democracy shield’, and on the housing crisis in the EU. Each committee will consist of 33 members and have an initial mandate of 12 months, which can be renewed. This temporary format is not new, as Parliament has previously formed committees to tackle issues such as organised crime, corruption, money laundering (CRIM), or the EU’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic (COVI).

The ‘European Democracy Shield’ special committee will focus on combating foreign interference and information manipulation, aligning with the Democracy Shield initiative outlined in Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s 2024–2029 political guidelines.

For its part, HOUS’s creation comes amid a sharp rise in housing costs, with average rent prices increasing by nearly 23% and house prices by almost 48% between 2010-2024. Although the EU’s competences in housing policy are limited, the European Commission recently appointed its first Housing Commissioner to coordinate national efforts. The new committee is expected to complement these efforts by exploring potential market reforms and mapping housing needs across the EU.

Policymakers’ reactions

The establishment of the new committees has garnered strong support from the European Parliament’s main political groups. The centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) welcomed the move, with EPP SANT Chair Adam Jarubas describing it as a vital step toward enhancing autonomy in medical procurement, improving crisis preparedness, and advancing the EU’s Health Union. MEP Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, the EPP Group’s Spokesman in SEDE, highlighted the committee’s expanded oversight role concerning the Commissioner for Defence and Space. Additionally, the EPP called for more decisive measures to protect the EU from foreign interference and to address the ongoing housing crisis.

The centre-left Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group also applauded the creation of the Housing Committee. S&D President Iratxe García emphasized her group’s commitment to advocating for the right to decent, affordable housing. She further endorsed the upgrade of SEDE’s mandate, acknowledging its importance in the current geopolitical climate.

Meanwhile, the centrist Renew Europe group celebrated the leadership roles it secured in the European Democracy Shield and SEDE committees. MEP Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, the new SEDE Chair, underscored the need for Europe to take responsibility for its own defence, stating that the committee would strive to build “a European Union of Defence.” MEP Nathalie Loiseau, the candidate for Chair of the special European Democracy Shield Committee, welcomed the agreement and stressed the importance of coordination against hostile actors.

What’s next

Now that the full committee line-ups have been announced, the new committees will hold their constitutive meetings this week, during which they will elect their Chairs and Vice-Chairs. Their work will commence from February 2025.

Image © European Union 2025 – Source : EP

How will the US election influence the CEE region?

The outcome of the upcoming U.S. presidential election will resonate far beyond American borders. No matter who becomes the next president of the United States, the election outcome will have profound and complex effects on the political, economic, and cultural dynamics of Central and Eastern Europe. To explore these potential impacts, Grayling’s local public affairs teams across 10 countries in the CEE region have prepared a comprehensive overview. The report’s context was set by an editorial from our Washington team at Dutko Government Relations.

Security challenges

The stakes of the U.S. elections are naturally highest for Ukraine, given the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. If Kamala Harris wins and the Democratic majority in Congress is preserved, no significant changes in policy are expected. However, if Harris wins but both houses of Congress are controlled by Republicans, delays in assistance to Ukraine might occur. The degree of delay would be directly proportional to the number of Trump supporters in Congress. Predicting Trump’s actions is challenging. The most likely scenario involves initial attempts to initiate negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, using leverage to reduce military and financial support to Ukraine. Depending on Ukraine’s resilience and the initiative of European allies, if Ukraine refuses negotiations and the EU compensates for part of the American support, Trump may reconsider his stance. A potential reduction in U.S. support might lead to a recalibration of Ukraine’s foreign policy, seeking stronger ties with European allies and other global partners.

US Military Presence (Military Personnel per Million Local Residents)

Source: Statista/US Department of Defense: Number of active duty military personnel in Europe, World Bank: Population data (gender statistics)

However, not only Ukraine, but the entire CEE region depends on the U.S., though to varying degrees. This dependency is captured by the Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity Index, a comprehensive metric developed by the Atlantic Council. This index and other indicators reveal that many countries in the region rely on the U.S. as both an economic partner and a security provider, indirectly through Germany. While there are about 600 active U.S. military personnel in the CEE region, Germany hosts the largest number of American troops—35,068 personnel. Although Pentagon officials may resist troop withdrawals, a potential Trump presidency could lead to reductions. Many countries in the region prepared for a Trump presidency by increasing their defence spendings and purchasing U.S. arms and military equipment.

US Influence Capacity (FBIC INDEX, 2020)

Source: Atlantic Council, Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity Index

Another concern is that some CEE countries, particularly Hungary, are deepening their ties with China. This could lead to challenges for either a Harris or Trump administration. Tensions with the U.S. are likely to escalate if “China hawks” gain influence within the State Department, regardless of who becomes president.

US impact on the economy

The region’s reliance on the U.S. is also reinforced through the German economy, a major U.S. trading partner, with nearly 10% of Germany’s exports going to the U.S. If Trump’s proposed protective tariffs on all foreign goods were implemented, Slovakia would be impacted most directly, as 4.5% of its exports were destined for the U.S. in 2023. Poland (3.1%) and Hungary (2.9%) also have notable levels of direct export dependency on the U.S. However, it’s important to note that a broad trade conflict would more likely affect the region indirectly, through its wider impact on the global economy. While Harris is also expected to pursue protectionist policies, her approach would likely be narrower, focusing on supporting U.S. manufacturing and reducing dependence on China.

Share of US in the export of goods

Source: Eurostat: Trade with the United States by EU Member States; Eurostat: International trade, by reporting country, total product; National Bank of Ukraine: External Trade; Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia: External Trade of Goods, EUR, 2023

Although trade balance is a lesser concern for mainstream economists, it carries significant political weight. During his first term, Donald Trump placed a strong emphasis on reducing the U.S. trade deficit and preventing other countries from “ripping off America”—suggesting that a large trade surplus could be a potential disadvantage if Trump were to win. In this regard, Germany is in the most precarious position, with a trade surplus of €85.8 billion with the United States. Most CEE countries also run trade surpluses with the U.S., with Slovakia having the largest surplus in 2023 at €4.22 billion. In contrast, Ukraine (€2.51 billion), Croatia (€480 million), and Serbia (€29 million) all have trade deficits with the US.

Trade balance of goods with the United States, 2023 (billion EUR)

Source: Eurostat: Trade with the United States by EU Member States; Eurostat: International trade, by reporting country, total product; National Bank of Ukraine: External Trade; Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia: External Trade of Goods, EUR, 2023

U.S.-CEE economic cooperations are expected to continue, especially in the energy sector. Croatia is working on expanding LNG capacity near the island of Krk, supported by the U.S. Although the project has been recently halted, Grayling expects that U.S. support for LNG will continue no matter the election outcome. One of the cornerstone initiatives of U.S.-Bulgarian cooperation is the collaboration in nuclear energy, which includes the construction of the seventh and eighth units of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). In Romania, an important U.S. project is the deployment of SMR nuclear reactors (expected to be completed by 2029). The project to build Poland’s first nuclear power plant, initiated by President Trump, has also gained support from Vice President Harris. Now, Poland is planning to construct its second nuclear power plant, with potential involvement from U.S. suppliers.

Conclusion

A Trump victory could weaken the region’s security through a more transactional approach to NATO and Russia. Economically, protectionist U.S. policies and potential shifts in energy and trade partnerships could create instability. Culturally, Trump’s support for nationalist, anti-migration, and anti-liberal rhetoric may further embolden right-wing movements. Ultimately, CEE countries might need to navigate a more uncertain transatlantic relationship under another Trump administration.

A Kamala Harris victory in the 2024 election would likely reinforce the U.S.’s role as a committed partner to the CEE region, particularly in matters of security, trade, and democratic governance. Politically, it would reassure CEE nations of continued U.S. support against Russian aggression and strengthen NATO’s presence. Economically, it would promote closer transatlantic ties, encourage investment in green energy, and sustain sanctions against Russia. However, Harris’s progressive stance on issues such as migration, LGBTQ+ rights, and democracy could lead to tensions with some conservative governments in CEE.

Download the report now for an in-depth look at how CEE-USA relationships shape the geopolitical landscape of the region.

On June 9, 2024, Hungary held two significant elections: voters simultaneously elected members of the European Parliament and municipal representatives. The campaign season was marked by political turmoil. A paedophilia scandal in February not only led to the resignation of President Novák but also severely eroded public support for Fidesz. Péter Magyar, a former Fidesz insider and ex-husband of former Justice Minister Varga (who also resigned due to the scandal), seized the opportunity to launch a public attack against Fidesz and founded his new TISZA party.

In May, Grayling Hungary prepared an election forecast to help our clients navigate this turbulent period. Our analysis was informed by insights from the country’s leading political analysts, pollsters, and social scientists. We distributed our questionnaire to experts from across the political spectrum, ensuring diverse perspectives. The survey asked them to estimate how many seats each Hungarian political party would secure in the European Parliament, predict the outcome of the mayoral race in Budapest, and identify cities where results were expected to be particularly close. Additionally, we invited experts to elaborate on their expectations, including the potential impact of the newly established TISZA party.

Why did we prepare our forecast?

In spring 2024, there was a high level of uncertainty due to the rapid pace of political developments and the fragmentation of the opposition landscape. Another source of uncertainty was the questionable predictive power of publicly available election polls in Hungary. Before the last parliamentary elections, both government-affiliated and independent pollsters overestimated support for the joint opposition by 4 to 11 percentage points and underestimated Fidesz support by 2 to 5 percentage points, according to Gábor Tóka’s estimations published in the Social Report 2022. However, it is important to note that polling averages were relatively accurate in predicting the results of the 2019 European elections, the 2018 general elections, and, as later confirmed, the 2024 European Parliament elections. Given these dynamics, we believed it would be valuable to survey experts on their expectations, as they can draw on data and insights unavailable to the public. Furthermore, our survey allowed room for experts to speculate on potential shifts in public sentiment. Most importantly, respondents were able to provide explanations for their predictions.

The proof of the pudding

In our forecast, we highlighted both the overall range of expert expectations for the distribution of MEP seats and the median predictions for each party. The expert narratives, as well as Grayling’s local insights, emphasized the significance of Péter Magyar and suggested that the TISZA party could fundamentally reshape the Hungarian party system. However, the experts slightly underestimated the magnitude of the political shift caused by TISZA’s emergence. While the median expectation was 10 seats for Fidesz and 6 seats for TISZA, both parties exceeded these predictions by winning an additional MEP seat each. In contrast, the DK-MSZP-Dialogue alliance secured only 2 MEP seats, falling short of the 3 seats expected by the experts. Consistent with the forecast, the far-right Our Homeland party gained one MEP seat, while Momentum, Jobbik, and the Green LMP all failed to return to the European Parliament. Many experts also predicted that the satirical Dog Party would win its first EP seat, but it fell short with only 2.6% of the vote.

Grayling Poll of Experts forecast and the results of the European elections

*DK, MSZP and Dialogue run together, but only DK gained MEP seats as a result of the alliance’s poor electoral performance.

We also compared the median forecast of experts surveyed by Grayling to the expected distribution of Hungarian MEP seats based on the final publicly available polls from various Hungarian research institutes. Like our median forecast, most polls underestimated the number of EP seats TISZA would secure. On average, predictions based on public opinion research were closer to Fidesz’s actual results than our experts’ median forecast.

Grayling’s May forecast proved to be as accurate as predictions from Medián Institute’s early June poll, as well as Századvég, Társadalomkutató’s May polls, and Iránytű’s April poll, with all forecasts deviating from the actual results by 4 seats. The least accurate poll was Republikon’s from late April, while 21 Research Center’s innovative “last minute” poll perfectly predicted the MEP seat distribution. Other polls released in late May or early June were also slightly more accurate than the median forecast of our expert survey.

Predicted distribution of Hungarian MEP seats

*Hungarian pollsters’ publicly available researches before the European election.

Projection is based on share of respondents who planned to vote in a given poll. Date is the middle of data collection.

Source: Vox Populi / Gábor Tóka, 21 Research Center

Drama in Budapest, fog in the countryside

We also evaluated the surveyed experts’ expectations regarding the municipal elections. Gergely Karácsony, the government-critical mayor of Budapest, was re-elected by a narrow margin of only 293 votes, following three recounts. Out of 14 responses, 11 experts accurately predicted this outcome, while 3 opted for his third-party challenger, Dávid Vitézy. Notably, two analysts who expected Vitézy to win correctly predicted that the governing Fidesz’s candidate, Alexandra Szentkirályi would withdraw from the race.

In the countryside, the majority of experts anticipated tight races in rural cities such as Győr, Eger, Szolnok, and Nyíregyháza. However, the races in Miskolc, Tatabánya, and Hódmezővásárhely turned out to be less competitive than many had expected. There are several, not necessarily mutually exclusive reasons why there was a high level of uncertainty regarding the municipal elections. First, the attention of political media is overly focused on Budapest, and local media significantly weakened in Hungary. Second, there is a lack of publicly available, reliable, local quality polls. Third, in many cases, the race was hard to oversee, as new political fronts opened in some rural towns (and also Budapest districts), where both the opposition and the government side was divided.