Archive: Election Hub

European elections and the chemical industry: the REACH revision saga

By Eugénie Boulo-Daniel, Public Affairs Manager | Brussels, European Union

As the 2024 European elections approach, a sense of anticipation ripples through Brussels, heralding a pivotal moment for the future of environmental policy and the chemical industry’s role within it. In this electrifying atmosphere, the ongoing saga of REACH revisions underscores the complexity of balancing human health, environmental protection, and economic interests. This year, the voices of millions will not only decide the political fate of Europe but also shape the trajectory of its environmental policy. As we stand on the cusp of these landmark elections, we explore how the evolving political landscape could reshape the EU‘s approach to its most pressing environmental challenges.

All eyes on the chemical industry since 2020

In the 2019 elections, climate change and environmental protection were centre stage in campaigns and political debates. This trend was reflected in the votes, with almost 10% of the European Parliament’s 705 seats going to the Greens political group, its highest score ever. President Ursula von der Leyen’s Commission answered these growing public concerns with the European Green Deal: a blueprint for transformational change in Europe’s economy and society.

As part of the Green Deal, the Commission launched the Chemical Strategy for Sustainability (CSS) in October 2020, which aimed to review the EU’s already sophisticated chemical legislation by further containing the most hazardous chemicals in the environment. The strategy’s ambitions included banning some of the most harmful chemicals in consumer products, by modifying the two main EU chemical legislations: the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) Regulation, and the Classification, Labelling and Packaging (CLP) Regulation.

56 actions were anticipated, with the more controversial to be tackled under the REACH revision – such as polymer registration, endocrine disruptors, PFAS restrictions, the introduction of an ‘essential use’ concept, reform of the authorisation and restrictions process, and the ‘safe and sustainable by design’ concept.

Over the past three years, the Commission services and external consultants have worked closely with the industry and relevant stakeholders to draft definitions and define concepts. The chemical sector, facing what they call a “double twin transition” (encompassing climate, digital, strategic autonomy, and sustainability), had long called for their own sectorial Transition Pathway, as set by Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton for many other economic ecosystems. Predictability, stability and coherence continue to be core asks from the sector.

Yet the REACH revision is proving to be a headache for the Commission’s services

While the current Commission took an important step forward by proposing a recast of the CLP Regulation in 2022, the REACH revision has been postponed repeatedly and is yet nowhere to be found.

One of the main new political concepts that will be proposed under the revised REACH is the “essential use” exemption criteria, to ensure that “the most harmful substances” chemicals are only allowed if their use is “necessary for the health, safety or is critical for the functioning of society” and if there are “no alternatives available”. This being said, despite some progress in the form of a report released by an external consultant in 2023, as of today there is no clear and common definition of “essential use”. This definition and how to introduce it in the approval process, amongst others, may be the reason behind the long REACH delay.

A key file in the hands of the next Commission

It is expected the EU elections campaign will be dominated by two issues: migration and the social costs of fighting climate change. The polls predict a rise of the far right and a remarkable decline of the liberal Renew group and of the Greens. This underscores the Green Deal fatigue felt across the EU, and a switch to an industrial and strategic autonomy perspective, in answer to nationalist concerns. The European People’s Party (EPP) remains in relatively strong in the polls and there is a widespread assumption that current Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will run for a second term (to be confirmed during the EPP summit in Bucharest on 6-7 March). While having to defend her Green Deal legacy, von der Leyen will also have to adapt to these more pressing concerns within her political group and more broadly across Europe.

The first consequences of that potential shift from a Green to an Industrial Deal will be reflected in both the timing of when the REACH revision proposal will be released – one of the first files of the new mandate, or one of the last of this mandate? – and how pro-industry its content is. Rumours announce a REACH revision in January 2025, a full three years after the initial timeline set in the CSS.

Once the proposal released, the institutional debate around the revision of REACH will be a key model of what to expect in the next mandate and how decisions will be taken with a polarised European Parliament, a fragile majority and a weaken voice from the Greens.

Watch this space

The years 2024-2029 will be particularly critical for the European chemical industry. The non-stop development of new green technologies is expected to lead to a doubling in chemicals production in 2030 compared to 2020. The impacts of the REACH revision, therefore, go beyond simply the chemicals industry and will affect the whole value chain in Europe and worldwide.

Green Dreams and Realities: Navigating Voter Fatigue in the EU Elections

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Farmers protests European Parliament - Greens European elections

By José Arroyo, Senior Consultant | Brussels, European Union

On the 4^th of February 2024, the European Greens officially adopted their election manifesto ahead of the European Parliament election in June. The Greens are currently the fifth biggest group in Parliament and have been influential during the past mandate in pushing for reforms to decarbonise the European economy under the European Green Deal. However, their electoral prospects are dire, and they are at risk of losing around a third of their seats as the EU faces growing backlash against its green agenda, as we witnessed very recently with farmers’ protests across the continent. Nevertheless, the Greens aim for even more ambitious climate goals for the 2024-2029 legislative term and have picked two high-profile MEPs to lead their campaign: Terry Reintke from Germany and Bas Eickhout from the Netherlands, two senior figures in the European Parliament, respectively running for their third and fourth terms in office. Much of their influence in the new Parliament depends on the results of the election and the alliances that will be formed after it.

Riding the green wave

From the 2^nd to the 4^th of February 2024, green politicians from across Europe met in Lyon, France, for their Electoral Congress, where they elected their lead candidates and adopted their manifesto. The Greens have seen a very successful few years in Europe, riding a green wave in 2019 that brought them their best-ever result in the last European elections. In addition, far from being a minority opposition movement, Green political parties form part of coalition governments in 6 EU Member States, with Germany as their crown jewel, where they are one third of the “traffic light” coalition along with the liberals and the social democrats of Chancellor Olaf Scholtz.

Green Deal ambition

During the current mandate of the European Parliament (2019-2024), the Greens have been instrumental in reforms to decarbonise key sectors in Europe’s economy, with the European Commission led by conservative Ursula von der Leyen even adopting many of their ideas. The Green Deal, a flagship initiative of the von der Leyen Commission, sets 2050 as the target date for the EU to become a climate neutral continent. This has translated into legislative reforms aiming to make almost all sectors more sustainable, from transport, to agriculture, packaging and buildings. Von der Leyen described these efforts as “Europe’s man on the moon moment” and holds up the Green Deal as an example to be followed by other countries aiming to move away from fossil fuels.

Green Deal fatigue

However, these ambitious climate targets and accompanying measures are facing increasing backlash, leading to ever declining popularity of Green political parties. For the past four years, for instance, farmers in the Netherlands have been protesting measures aimed at cutting agricultural pollution as they argue they would hurt their business and reduce their already meagre incomes. This even led to the founding of a new farmers’ party to represent their concerns that made important inroads in the Dutch provincial election earlier this year. The success of the protests and concerns around farmers’ livelihoods may have also contributed to the success of far-right leader Geert Wilders in the national election last year. The farmers’ protests have now spread across the bloc with a mass tractor protests blocking the European quarter in Brussels on the 1^st of February 2024. European leaders such as French President Macron and Belgian Prime Minister De Croo have echoed this “climate fatigue” by asking for a “regulatory pause” on further environmental legislation.

Because of this, the European Greens face a significant electoral setback in June, with polls predicting a loss of a third of their seats and the group going from the fifth to the seventh largest in Parliament, which would leave them with little influence in the legislative process. Nationalist and Eurosceptic parties are in contrast expected to make substantial gains, with the next Parliament likely to veer to the right.

Renewed ambition

In this context, the Greens are set to campaign on a so-called “Green Social Deal”. They aim for the EU to bring forward its climate-neutrality objective from 2050 to 2040 and for an end to the use of coal by 2030, and of all fossil fuels by 2040. They also target fossil subsidies, which they want to see phased out by 2025 with “all other environmentally harmful subsidies” being withdrawn by 2027. As an alternative, the Greens want to transform Europe’s energy system so that it relies completely on solar, water, wind, and geothermal energy by 2040. Importantly, they no longer mention biofuels, which were mentioned back in the 2019 manifesto as having a role to play so long as they did not compete with food production or cause biodiversity loss. In addition, the Greens want to transform the controversial Common Agricultural Policy (the EU fund supporting agriculture) to redirect the money into organic farming and agroecological production.

To finance these changes, the Greens would increase national taxation and push for taxes at the EU level. They would establish a minimum capital gains tax in the EU, push Member States to implement the OECD agreement on corporate minimum tax, extend the carbon border tax to new polluting sectors, apply the “polluter pays” principle across all sectors, create a European Financial Transactions Tax, and make the EU windfall tax on energy companies permanent. With these new revenues, they would reinforce the social welfare state, passing a directive on minimum income to establish an adequate level of support (60% of the median income) in each EU country for people between jobs or who cannot work.

A smaller platform post-elections

Despite the growing Green Deal fatigue, the Greens aim to continue pressing for the EU to increase its ambitions for the green transition, demanding stricter targets and advocating for a wider social support network to respond to the social costs of strict environmental measures. They embrace the green achievements of this mandate but demand more action for the next one. Some of their proposals are unlikely to be realised. For example, the European Commission is very unlikely to consider bringing forward its 2050 decarbonisation target and it’s difficult to imagine 27 EU countries agreeing on a common European tax on financial transactions.

However, the real question is how strong the Greens will be in the European Parliament after the election, and how they can leverage their votes to transform some of their demands into actual policy in cooperation with other groups. Much depends on the electoral results and the alliances that will emerge after election day. During the current mandate, the informal governing coalition has been composed of the EPP (centre-right), the S&D (centre-left), Renew Europe (liberals), with occasional support from the Greens. With a strong showing for parties to the right of the EPP, it would be tempting for the EPP to move away from its current allies and reach either formal and informal deals with the ECR (conservatives) or ID (far-right) political groups. In this relatively unlikely scenario, the Greens will have little say in the new mandate. Even if this does not happen, a stronger right-wing in the Parliament will leave the Greens with less leverage to implement their policies.

Of course, there are still four months to go, and campaigning is just starting, so it’s still all to play for. But, as recent protests show, the Greens are facing an uphill battle to convince voters of the need for yet more ambitious climate laws.

Slovenia ahead of the European elections: an increasingly unpopular government

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By Tjaša Doljak, PA Consultant | Slovenia

Slovenian political parties are gearing up for the 2024 European election race, coinciding with the mid-term of the current left-green(ish) government. Despite enjoying strong public support in its initial year, PM Robert Golob’s Freedom Movement party is now experiencing a decline in popularity among voters.

Current government faces significant decline in public support

Just a year ago, 58.2% of respondents rated the government’s work as successful while in November 2023, the picture is completely reversed, with 56.3% of respondents now rating the government’s work as unsuccessful. The polls also revealed that the public’s trust in the work of PM Golob has significantly declined, with a rating of 2.33 (out of 5) for his work. This marks one of the lowest ratings given to PMs in Slovenian history, and, in the past, such low ratings have often resulted in votes of no confidence.

This has led to a considerable drop in support for the PM’s Freedom Movement party, down from 40% immediately after the 2022 elections to just 27.8%. A notable concern for politicians is the increase in undecided voters, growing from 19% in January 2023 to 33% at the end of the year.

A series of obstacles

That being said, it does not appear to be the end for PM Golob just yet. A low approval rating is to be expected given the challenges Slovenia – and most of Europe – is facing, including economic slowdown, high inflation, and increased prices of goods and services.

At the same time, Golob’s actions – such as proposing an increase in taxes, unmet promises of a reform of the health system, the introduction of a very rigid system for recording employee working hours, along with allegations of unauthorised pressure on the former interior minister among others – have contributed to his declining popularity with voters.

2024: a year of reconstruction

Slovenia’s primary challenge in 2024 is expected to be post-flood reconstruction. In August 2023, heavy rainfall led to severe flooding in many parts of Slovenia, marking the most significant natural disaster since Slovenian independence in 1991. The catastrophic floods resulted in loss of life, extensive damage to homes, and destruction of roads and infrastructure.

Countless businesses were affected, resulting in estimated damages ranging from 3 to 9 billion euros. The reconstruction budget has yet to be defined as the government is still finalising the so-called flood reconstruction act, thought plans include a 5-year tax on banks’ balance sheets and a temporary increase in taxes on legal entities’ incomes. This measures will be difficult to swallow with the national economy in a cooling-off phase.

Slovenia in the European Parliament

Slovenia has 8 representatives in the European Parliament, evenly split between the centre-right and centre-left. The largest opposition party, centre-right SDS (EPP), together with the non-parliamentary people’s party SLS, holds three MEPs while the Christian party NSi (EPP) has one MEP. On the left, the Social Democrats (S&D) and the Freedom Movement (Renew) each have two Slovenian MEPs.

All the current MEPs are publicly recognized individuals, with some of them having already served more than one term in Brussels. It is still too early for any predictions regarding the outcome of the EU elections (candidate lists are still under preparation), especially for voters not leaning towards centre-right parties, who typically tend to decide at the last minute.

Could Slovenia get a 9^th MEP?

There are currently 705 MEPs in the European Parliament. In June 2023, the European Parliament proposed that the number of MEPs should increase to 720 after the 2024 elections. This would result in an increase in the number of MEPs for certain countries including Slovenia, increasing the country’s representation in the Parliament.

Will the Czech Republic reverse its historically low voter turnout in the European elections?

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By Michal Šiffner, Senior Public Affairs Consultant | Czech Republic

A chance to reverse historically low voter turnout?

The Czech Republic is gearing up for the European Parliament election, ending a year and half of electoral inactivity—a notable anomaly in the typically dynamic Czech political environment. However, the European Parliament elections do not tend to attract significant attention from Czech voters; in 2019, the Czech Republic had the second-lowest voter turnout of all EU member states.

Research on voter turnout suggests that Czech politicians have so far failed to communicate the value of the European Parliament to citizens. Although election day is still quite far away, the current situation is already beginning to suggest that this time the situation may be a bit different compared to the previous European elections and the parliamentary parties will be careful not to underestimate the situation.

Knock-on effects of the EU disconnect

Low voter turnout in the European Parliament elections traditionally benefits center-right parties (currently leading the government coalition), which generally count on more educated and engaged voters with a greater interest in European issues. In contrast, the strongest opposition party of former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, ANO, despite its current high popularity, will have to face up to the fact that its voters are not particularly interested in what is happening at the EU level. The ANO’s goal will be to mobilise voters and ensure the highest possible turnout, while undoubtedly trying to take advantage of the citizens’ dissatisfaction with the current economic situation.

A loss of trust in traditional political parties

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Petr Fiala’s present government finds itself contending with unprecedented low public opinion midway through his term, and surveys reveal a notable level of distrust. In fact, all parties of the ruling five-party coalition are gradually losing popularity. Support for Fiala’s ODS is around 12%, Pirates 10%, STAN 6%, TOP 09 5%, and KDU-ČSL 4%. This trend has been spurred by a crumbling economy and record inflation, but also by the government’s poor external communication. The opposition SPD is currently polling around 10% which shows rather stable support for his far-right anti-system party. Meanwhile, ANO’s Babiš is a clear frontrunner, leading the polls with around 33% support.

The upcoming European Parliament election may, to some extent, serve as a referendum on the current government. For all political parties, it will act as a litmus test for the regional elections that will take place just four months later.

Complex coalitions for the European elections

Government coalition parties ODS, KDU-ČSL and TOP09 have decided to run together again as part of the SPOLU (“together” in Czech) coalition, as they did in the 2021 general elections. While SPLOU proved to be a strong brand in these elections, it might be a risky move from the perspective of the European elections. While domestically, the SPOLU parties are largely aligned on most issues, there are long-standing differences, particularly in matters related to the EU, most notably over adoption of the euro. In the European Parliament, ODS also belongs to a different political group than the other two coalition partners.

In the national elections, voters were able to overlook these differences with the prospect of removing Andrej Babiš from power. However, in the European Parliament election, this could pose complications. For many TOP09 voters, the most liberal and pro-European party in the SPOLU coalition, it may be difficult to simultaneously support conservative and Eurosceptic Alexander Vondra from ODS, who is the leader of the SPOLU candidate list. However, the decision to run together to maintain the thus far successful SPOLU brand should be therefore seen more in the context of the 2025 regional and general elections, rather than as a tactic for the 2024 European elections.

More names to watch on the MEP candidate lists

The other two members of the current government coalition, STAN and Pirates, have confirmed they will not repeat their cooperation from 2021 following internal disagreements. In assembling their candidate list, the Pirates will rely on their current MEPs – led by the current MEP Marcel Kolaja – in combination with less-known party members. Meanwhile, the STAN candidate list will be led by an experienced politician and former member of parliament, Jan Fárský, along with well-known economist Danuše Nerudová, who enjoys significant support among young and liberal-minded voters.

The opposition party ANO will no longer be able to rely on its most successful MEPs, Dita Charanzová and Martina Dlabajová, as they both left the party due to its shift away from liberal politics towards nationalism and conservatism. In the European elections, the party will be led by the less well-known former Minister for Regional Development Klára Dostálová, whom ANO presents as an expert on European funds. The party will once again seek to attract voters primarily based on the personality of the party leader, Andrej Babiš, though he is not running in the European elections himself. As mentioned earlier, it is likely that ANO will focus primarily on voters dissatisfied with the current government, competing especially with protest parties such as the far-right populist SPD.

European elections: a barometer of public sentiment

As the election season unfolds, the results will serve as a barometer of public sentiment towards the current government and provide insights into Czech political dynamics on both domestic and European fronts, especially ahead of important regional and general elections in 2025.

European elections 101

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By Charles FELD – Director, Energy, Environment and Transport | Brussels, European Union

So… what are the European elections? Who can vote? Who can stand for election? When are they happening? How on earth can 27 countries coordinate voting? And why does it matter?

Watch the video below to find out…

European elections: Belgium’s priorities and the great packaging debate

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By Sophie JACOBS – Agrifood Director | Brussels, European Union

On the 1^st of January, Belgium assumed the six-month European Union Council Presidency: a pivotal moment for shaping the future of EU policies. However, this leadership role comes with unique challenges, as Belgium only has a few weeks at the beginning of its presidency to finalise crucial negotiations with the European Parliament on key legislative files if it wants them to be adopted during this Parliament’s mandate.

A key focus for Belgium during its presidency is the Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation (PPWR): new rules aimed at cutting down on packaging waste and underpinning Europe’s transition to a circular economy. The goal of this legislation is to ensure that ‘’all packaging in the EU is reusable or recyclable in an economically viable way by 2030”. It outlines the fundamental criteria for packaging design and composition, establishing targets for the reusability, collection and recycling of packaging materials.

While there is agreement on the legislation’s goals, debates are ongoing about the best methods for achieving them. The Council’s adoption of its position on the text in mid-December – despite outstanding disagreements amongst Member States – confirms the determination of all parties involved to get the PPWR finalised before the June elections. The Belgian Presidency now faces the complex task of reconciling ’divergent positions within the Council and bridging the gap with the European Parliament’s more industry-friendly approach. The outcome of these negotiations holds considerable importance for industry given the ubiquity of packaging, and will impact the entire supply chain.

Balancing ambition with supply chain realities

As highlighted above, despite the Spanish Presidency’s success in securing adoption of the Council General Approach at the end of last year, several Member States expressed reservations about the current text. Discontent arose particularly around balancing reuse and recycling, with some countries expressing disappointment with a lack of ambition, while others criticised the overemphasis on reuse. Balancing these divergent perspectives will be challenging, but Belgium’s reputation for moderation and creativity to build compromises is an important asset.

In addition, the Commission’s role in the upcoming discussions (so-called “trilogues”) should not be underestimated. Commissioner Sinkevičius reiterated the need for an ambitious text that goes beyond recycling and defended the Commission’s proposed targets for reusable packaging, rejecting criticism of the Commission’s impact assessment. Last minute changes to the Council position included a provision which would require a review of the 2040 reuse targets based on a life cycle assessment of single-use and reuse packaging. Will this be enough to please the Parliament, or will it hold firm on immediate exemptions from reuse targets if reuse is not the option delivering the best environmental outcome?

The debate extends beyond reuse, with bans on certain packaging formats sparking controversy in both the Parliament and Council; the Council’s decision to limit the ban on single use packaging for fresh fruits and vegetables to only plastic packaging raises questions about the rationale behind this restriction and why it was not then extended to the other banned packaging formats.

The clock is ticking

All three EU institutions have been working under immense pressure, with the PPWR being one of the most heavily lobbied files of this mandate. As the negotiations enter into the final stages, the pressure will be ramped up even further as all parties seek to reach an agreement ahead of the European elections – or run the risk of having the file re-opened under the next mandate. The current Parliament in particular will be keen to finalise the text, with MEPs involved in the file looking to be able to point to huge success as part of their campaigns.

Belgium’s diplomatic skills will be put to the test as it seeks to reconcile diverse interests an in extremely tight timeframe. Discussions will start this week and should be finalised before 9 March. The hope is that decisions made within this pressure cooker over the next few months will nevertheless take into account the far-reaching consequences on businesses in Europe, and that the final text will effectively mitigate the environmental impact of packaging and packaging waste without putting the entire supply chain at risk.

Shifting tides in European politics: the rise of the ‘Dutch Trump’

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By Jessica BROBALD – Managing Director | Brussels, European Union

As the European Elections loom just a few months away, the result of the recent elections in the Netherlands sent shockwaves across the European Union.
Despite optimistic developments in Poland, it is evident that no EU Member State is immune to the rising tide of nationalism and extremist ideologies – not even those historically seen as progressive bastions of democracy.

A shock victory for the far-right

In a striking turn of events, Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) clinched 37 seats out of 150 in the Dutch Lower House, garnering 23% of the vote. This surge propels the party to the forefront of Dutch politics for the first time, surpassing both the liberal VVD and the nascent Labour-Green Alliance led by former European Commission Vice-President Frans Timmermans. This shift toward populism raises pressing questions: what are the implications of this political landscape change for the EU, especially in the context of the forthcoming elections? And more importantly, what does this mean for the future of European unity and policy-making?

Tapping into voters’ fears

Geert Wilders’ recent electoral success in the Netherlands is largely attributed to his party’s focus on four critical issues: migration, social inequalities, housing, and healthcare. These topics have gained immense significance against the backdrop of the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, which have triggered substantial migration flows into Europe. This influx has exerted considerable pressure on EU democracies, challenging them to accommodate these new arrivals with housing and support amidst soaring energy prices and growing hardships faced by their own citizens in maintaining their living standards. In this complex scenario, the ruling VVD party appears to have lost traction with voters. Similarly, Frans Timmermans’ emphasis on environmental concerns, while significant, has seemingly failed to strike a chord with the Dutch electorate. Unless traditional parties are able to respond to their citizens’ immediate concerns, this trend could be reproduced in the upcoming EU elections.

Election victory sparks coalition chaos

The unfolding political landscape in the Netherlands, with the PVV’s recent triumph, has set the stage for complex coalition negotiations. While the PVV, under Geert Wilders, eagerly anticipates leading the government, the path to forming a viable coalition remains challenging. Prospective partners include the centre-right New Social Contract (NSC) and the conservative farmers’ party, BBB. However, even with these alliances, Wilders would need additional support, potentially from the liberal VVD, to secure a majority. Should these efforts falter, Frans Timmermans’ Labour-Green Alliance might seize the opportunity to form a government. Yet, this would require the collaboration of four or five partners, a scenario which would be prone to internal divisions and subject to constant scrutiny from the PVV. This political fragility could trigger yet another round of snap elections, further destabilising the Dutch political arena.

A new member of the European populist leaders’ club

On a broader European scale, the rise of Wilders could alter the power dynamics in the European Council. Joining forces with other populist leaders like Slovakia’s Fico, Italy’s Meloni, and Hungary’s Orban, Wilders’ potential influence in the Council could reshape the EU’s stance on critical issues. Key policies under threat include reduced aid to Ukraine, opposition to increasing the EU budget, and a harder line in handling the migration crisis. Moreover, the PVV’s climate-sceptical agenda could undermine the Netherlands’ commitment to the Green Deal and weaken the EU’s position in global climate negotiations.

Shaking up the traditional balance of power in the European Parliament

As the European Elections draw near, the recent Dutch elections reveal a challenging landscape for traditional and progressive narratives alike and confirm the loss of traction of traditional political groups. Post-European elections, attention may need to shift to the right of the EPP (the centre-right political group that currently holds a majority in the European Parliament) to monitor how populist groups reorganise, potentially forming new political groups and impacting the potential coalitions in the Parliament.

Practically speaking, if this trend continues, we could see a significant increase in leadership roles, speaking opportunities, and rapporteur positions on key issues being allocated to Eurosceptic and populist members in the Parliament, which could undermine EU ambitions and stall progress on key legislative files. However, the full extent of these changes will only become clear next year, making it a critical period to observe for future EU policymaking dynamics.

The European Elections will be more than a litmus test for political trends; they will be a decisive factor in shaping the trajectory of the European Union in an increasingly complex and dynamic world.

Germany in the run-up to the European elections

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By Johannes HEUSER – Head of Public Affairs | Germany

European elections: performance review of the traffic light coalition?

Elections of the European Parliament are always highly influenced by domestic political dynamics. The so-called “traffic light coalition” of Social Democrats (SPD), Greens and Liberals (FDP) – in office since winter 2021 – has been criticised for months and its popularity is waning. The most recent illustration of this dynamic were the state elections in Bavaria and Hesse, where all parties suffered severe setbacks at the ballot box.

This is in large part due to the fractures between the coalition partners. While the FDP is often criticised as a blocking party due to its centre-right political orientation, the Greens on the other hand face accusations of overly ideological policies. The SPD, the party of the chancellor, tries to position itself as a mediating third-party, but is currently losing ground in the polls as well.

Winners of this behaviour are the conservative parties: Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). The internal conflicts within the coalition provide both parties with plenty of tactical ammunition for the upcoming European election campaigns. If the parties of the traffic light fail to develop a positive narrative on their governing polices in the coming months, they can all expect severe losses.

Migration policy – the key underlying debate in German elections

One key political battleground in Germany is migration. The EU is facing an increased volume of migration and the question of how to adequately deal with this development is at the centre of German inner politics, despite the recent agreement on the EU asylum and migration pact.

Some political figures try to use this development to their advantage: proposals for a harsher migration regime, for instance, by Thorsten Frei, whip of the opposition parties CDU/CSU, call for the abolition of the individual right to asylum, and migration is likely to be a central issues of the parties’ election campaigns.

Similarly, the far right-wing AfD has been at a polling at a high for weeks. While the party achieved 10.3% in the federal elections back in September 2021, it is currently polling at more than 20%. The promise of CDU leader Friedrich Merz – “With me there will be a ‘firewall’ to the AfD” – is being questioned by his own party, and this firewall could well crumble in light of the European elections.

Manfred Weber (CSU), head of the EPP (centre-right) European parliamentary group, has publicly described the AfD as his party’s main rival in next year’s European elections. At the same time he has forged close links with Giorgia Meloni, Italian Prime Minister and part of the European Conservatives and Reformers (ECR) political group. In Germany, as in many other Member states, the question of liberal vs. illiberal party movements and their identity as regards the EU will keep resurfacing.

Climate policy – an issue that will be dividing German voters

The Green transition remains a perennial issue in German discourse. The European Green Deal aims to make Europe the first continent to become climate-neutral by 2050. Naturally, such a project entails conflicting goals between economy and ecology, which will be fought out between the German parties in the upcoming European election campaign. If past debates (such as the dispute over the phase-out of combustion engines or the reform of the German Climate Protection Act) are anything to go by, the issue will continue to elicit controversial and emotional reactions throughout the election campaigns.

EU enlargement and structural reforms – heralds to state aid and subsidies discussions in the next term

Germany is the largest net contributor to the EU. In view of the discussions about EU enlargement, which could result in the accession of financially weaker countries such as Ukraine or Moldova, there concerns around the potential negative impact on German state finances.

The traffic-light coalition remains split on the issue of structural reforms: While members of the Bundestag from the Greens and the SPD welcomed structural reforms in the monetary policy arena, the FDP categorically rejects the idea of regulating European financial and fiscal policy through majority decisions instead of unanimity. Even though this issue is currently only discussed among expert circles, it might also spill-over on the parties’ stance on state aid and subsidies, leaving Germany even more divided.

Party front runners – No surprises

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (CDU) has yet to confirm whether she will seek another term in office after the European elections. Despite past power struggles between von der Leyen and Manfred Weber, CSU member and head of the European People’s Party (EPP), the only thing that seems certain is that if she wants to, she is sure to be nominated by the EPP.

The SPD has announced Katarina Barley, Vice-President of the European Parliament, as its top candidate for the second time. Barley has campaigned for decisive action against violations of the rule of law in the European Union and has been critical of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban.

The FDP has nominated defence expert Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann as its top candidate, which could indicate the growing importance of security policy issues in the party’s positioning. Strack-Zimmermann gained popularity as an advocate of comprehensive arms aid for Ukraine despite directly criticising her coalition partner Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD).

The Greens will not decide on their top candidate until November; however the odds are on Terry Reintke, co-president of the Greens in the European Parliament.

The AfD has chosen Maximilian Krah as its top candidate, a far-right nationalist.

The Left is led by its party leader Martin Schirdewan, who is currently a co-group leader in the European Parliament. With the announcement of a new leftist party in Germany led by Sarah Wagenknecht the role of the far-left may diminish overall.

While personnel discussion, will be a key part of the constitution of the next European Parliament and the European Commission, Germany as the largest economy in Europe, will remain one of the key power players driving the overall policy agenda in Brussels. If you are looking for in-depth analysis of Germany’s stance on policies and stakeholder, get in touch with our Berlin office.

Unpacking Hungary’s double election year

| By Jessica Brobald | 0 Comments

By Samu MARCZ – Account Director | Hungary

Double trouble for the opposition?

The government will want to avoid a repeat of opposition coordination that brought success in 2019 when candidates ran jointly in major cities, challenging the over 10 years of governing party dominance and notably recapturing Budapest.

Failing to capitalise on government unpopularity

As far as the municipal elections go, opposition parties are running out of time to conduct primary elections and are generally much less coordinated than in 2019. Despite a decline in support for the government amidst economic downturn, the fragmentation of the opposition spells little in the way of change. Governing parties are likely to reclaim several municipalities, with the notable exception of Budapest, which is expected to remain an opposition stronghold.

Government party to dominate European seats

For the European Parliament elections, governing parties are expected to secure half of the 21 available seats, as they have done consistently since 2004. The unofficial choice for leader of the Fidesz-KDNP party list is former Minister of Justice Judit Varga, who recently stepped down from her position to focus on European politics.

Varga, in contrast to EU Minister Tibor Navracsics, has played the role of the bad cop in negotiations with the EU regarding issues of corruption and the rule of law in Hungary.

Opposition candidates include The Democratic Coalition, led by former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, and the liberal Momentum party, who are expected to win most of the 8–10 opposition seats. One or two other opposition parties also likely to secure seats, including the far-right party Our Homeland Movement and the satirical Two-Tailed Dog Party.

Resurgence of the populist right?

Despite Prime Minister Orbán’s vision of a right-wing populist breakthrough in European elections, such a scenario does not look set to materialise. Given that the governing parties’ MEPs resigned as members of the European People’s Party in 2021, they are expected to either continue as independents or join a less influential political group within the European Parliament.

The Parliament is viewed as the most critical EU institution of the Hungarian government, in contrast to the Council, where Viktor Orbán has successfully negotiated political agreements in recent years. Such manoeuvrability is set to be tested by the Law and Justice (PiS) party’s loss in Poland’s national election. PiS proved a key ally in Council. However, Orbán can expect support from Robert Fico, who has recently returned to power in Slovakia.

Economic woes could worsen EU relationship

The Hungarian government finds itself in a challenging position on the European front. Record-high inflation and economic difficulties are further exacerbated by the withholding of EU funds. Ongoing tensions between the Orbán government and the EU revolve around rule-of-law and corruption concerns.

The government introduced four justice reforms in the spring, but the European Commission has raised questions on judicial independence.

Rumours suggest any agreement reached would involve Hungary not vetoing planned EU financial support for Ukraine. In exchange, Hungary could gain access to roughly half of the EU’s allocated funds (22 billion euros) and loans (3.9 billion euros), totalling around 13 billion euros.

Presiding over change

Adding to the complexity, Hungary will hold the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2024. A number of MEPs have attempted to throttle Hungary’s power in the role and even questioned whether it should be allowed to hold it.

However, the European Council, comprising the leaders of EU member states, is ultimately responsible for the decision and is reluctant to change the schedule. Hungary’s Presidency will coincide with key events: the formation of the new European Parliament and European Commission, and the adoption of the annual EU budget.

Beyond establishing a Ministry of EU Affairs in 2023, Hungary has laid out priorities that include the likes of competitiveness, artificial intelligence, promoting EU values, EU enlargement into the Western Balkans and combatting illegal migration.

The 2024 European and municipal elections in Hungary promise to be a very interesting period. Grayling is here to assist our clients in navigating this complex landscape.

Ahead of 2024 European election: Poland in election frenzy

| By Ayer Mehmet | 0 Comments

By Aleksandra WRÓBEL – Public Affairs Consultant | Poland

The 2024 European election will take place between the 6th and the 9th of June 2024 – Council of the EU announced late May. For Poland, it signals an addition to the already tight electoral schedule comprising local and presidential elections, to be held in April 2024 and mid-2025 respectively. With the latest October parliamentary election, the country has entered a permanent campaign mode, exposing key political players to heightened scrutiny of their daily work.

Reversing Anti-European Course

The October 15th general election in Poland is commonly regarded as a game-changer.

For the last years, the country has been ruled by Law and Justice (PiS) – a conservative party that to this day enjoys around 30% of support owing to its popular social policies that are thought to have restored dignity to marginalized groups. This agenda was combined with Euroscepticism and revanchism directed at e.g. legal elites, producing and successively deepening the rule-of-law spat with Brussels. The latter eventually resulted in the European Commission triggering “atomic” Article 7 procedure and opening the path for the suspension of Poland’s voting rights within the bloc. Additionally, the conflict led to the freezing of post-COVID recovery funds for Warsaw.

The current state of affairs in Poland’s relations with the EU is very likely to change significantly in the recently began term of the parliament. Following the October general election, the majority has been secured by a coalition of four parties – liberal Civic Coalition (KO), agrarian Polish People’s Party (PSL), anti-polarization Poland 2050 and progressive The Left – who together pledge to reform the judiciary, combat the politicization of public institutions and restore Poland’s participation in the European-wide dialogue. The latter promise will bear a particular meaning in the light of the 2025 Polish EU Council presidency.

How Will This Shift Affect European Election?

Historically, Poles have hardly presented themselves as the nation that is most eager to cast a ballot in the European election. Quite contrarily, the turnout in three elections between 2004 and 2014 failed to surpass 25% each time.

The big breakthrough came in 2019, when most opposition parties united against the then-ruling Law and Justice, substantially intensifying the public debate and consequently driving polarization. This entailed the highest-ever turnout of 45,68%.

Since then, the rivalry between conservative and liberal blocs has only become fiercer. Given the upcoming sequence of elections, the timing of which does not allow for pauses in campaigning, it can be expected that the mobilization will remain at least as high as five years earlier.

Which Factors Will Drive The Result?

According to a poll conducted after the general election, Poles mainly rely on the incoming government to address economic hurdles that had emerged following the pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine. In a study by SW Research, the top three government priorities identified by respondents include: the fight against inflation, the unblocking of EU recovery funds and the need to lower taxes. Therefore, economic policies will be thoroughly monitored and commented on as part of each of the upcoming campaigns.

Concurrently, it must be highlighted that the liberal opposition’s victory in the parliamentary election, which saw the highest-ever turnout in Central and Eastern Europe (74,38%), constitutes massive mandate in favor of Poland’s stronger place within united Europe. Accordingly, it will matter how the new cabinet will approach the task of improving relations between Warsaw and Brussels. An important aspect of this mission will be to implement judicial reform, causing a stir among defeated Law and Justice and thus fueling polarization ahead of local and European elections.

Finally, as far as the EU is concerned, its future will be yet another important topic of discussion between conservative and liberal camps. This is evidenced by the first reactions to the proposed reform of EU treaties, which the members of the outgoing government already branded as an attempt to deprive Poland of independence and consolidate the bloc under German leadership. Although Donald Tusk – new PM and former president of European Council, who will undertake the mission of improving Poland’s standing within the EU – publicly rejected the idea of changing the bloc’s political system in response to enlargement, his opponents will likely continue suggesting otherwise, weaponizing his previous associations to make political gains. In this context, the topic of migration might also come up. Once again, although there’s a general consensus over the need to better control people inflows and protect the border, politicians will likely embrace this subject as a tool to fight their opponents.

What Will The Polish Delegation In EP Look Like?

Post-Brexit, Poland’s representation in the European Parliament consists of 52 MEPs. In the 2019-2024 term, 26 of them allied with right-wing PiS/ECR, 17 with center-right EPP (which combines two national parties: liberal Civic Coalition and agrarian Polish People’s Party) and 8 with center-left S&D. Since the election, some of them switched parties, with one joining Greens/European Free Alliance and one becoming the only Polish Renew MEP.

While in 2019 most of the now governing liberal opposition ran together, in 2023 these parties will likely form three separate blocs. In the parliamentary election, this proved to be the most effective strategy for them to maximize support.

Based on current polls, it can be predicted that EPP will gain at the expense of ECR following the latter’s member party PiS losing a parliamentary election after 8 years in power. Given the electoral success of Poland 2050 – a new center-right party founded by former TV host and current speaker of the Sejm Szymon Hołownia – Renew may also hope to increase its standing. Finally, taking into consideration the presence of far-right Confederation in the parliament and its links to Identity and Democracy (ID) Group, the fraction will probably also obtain some Polish members.

Way Ahead

If you are wondering about how the upcoming sequence of elections in Poland could impact your business, you came to the right place. Message us at publicaffairspl@grayling.com to schedule a chat on how we can help you maneuver around complicated yet fascinating world of Polish politics.

Election year in Slovakia

| By Ayer Mehmet | 0 Comments

By Matej KOVAC – Consultant | Slovakia

Slovakia in the second half of the year 2023 has entered an “election year” starting by general election in September, presidential election in March 2024 and European election in June 2024. All three elections will be similar what regards the blocs running in them. Since the second round of the presidential election will be held at the beginning of April, the agenda of European election will need to wait until April. We expect to have two principal blocs – pro-European (led by PS) and sceptic (led by Smer-SD) competing against each other.

The general elections took place on September 30, 2023. Smer-SD (social democrats, Chairman – Robert Fico) won the parliamentary elections, obtaining 22,94% of the votes. Also other six parties PS, Hlas-SD, OĽaNO a Priatelia, KDH, SaS, SNS entered the parliament. The former ruling party OĽaNO gained just 8,9% compared to 25% in 2020 elections.

Source: sme.sk

Coalition Government Smer-SD, Hlas-SD and SNS

The outcome of the early parliamentary elections brought about a significant shift at the level of the government. Smer-SD emerged as the winner and reached a coalition agreement with Hlas-SD and SNS, becoming the next ruling party.

In accordance with the memorandum of understanding endorsed by all three upcoming coalition parties, the allocation of ministries is delineated as follows:

Smer-SD – 6 ministries including the post of the Prime Minister
Hlas-SD – 7 ministries (the party will also assume the position of the Chairman of the Parliament)
SNS (Slovak National Party) – 3 ministries (the Ministry of Tourism and Sport to be established from 1. January 2024)

War in Ukraine and high inflation as key electoral factors

The general election campaign led by Smer-SD was focused on several issues – an anti-war stance and a stop for the military support of Ukraine, high inflation, victimization of the opposition. Smer-SD was very offensive toward the current President Zuzana Čaputová claiming her responsibility for the persecution of the opposition by the Police and the Office of Special Prosecutor.

On the other hand, he strongly rejected the idea of referendum proposed by Republika about the leaving EU and NATO. He confirmed Slovakia’s pro-European stance and its place within the EU and NATO structures, but he is open to criticize EU when needed. As the prime minister he wants to have close cooperation between the Visegrad Four countries.

It is needed to be reminded that for Robert Fico campaigning and governing are two different models of behavior. During the press conference held after the elections he repeated his former government’s successes – entering Schengen and Eurozone.

Business environment and tax policies

He is aware of the importance of stable business environment and foreign investments, especially in the difficult situation regarding the deficit and public finances.

Among the numerous challenges the new government will confront in the coming years, one of the most significant pertains to the state budget deficit, which is expected to further deepen. This pressure drives modifications in taxation, involving either the increase of current taxes or the introduction of new taxes. At present, the sector most likely to be facing additional taxation is the banking industry. The new government in its Policy Statement claimed to impose additional taxes on negative externalities (e.g., alcohol and cigarettes), and reevaluating the property tax calculation. Also, there is a claim stating open doors for further windfall taxation of other sectors.

“In the field of taxation, the government will advocate for the implementation of specific financial instruments for taxing extraordinary profits of various sectors, corporations, legal entities, and individuals. The objective is to generate resources for financing targeted public policies.”

Nonetheless, the future coalition parties hold different stances on these measures in relation to one another, leaving the implementation of deficit-handling measures uncertain. It remains unclear which, of these measures will be put into effect.

The main pressure for the parties to address this matter stems from the budgetary rules enshrined in the Constitutional Act on Budgetary Rules, often referred to as the “debt brake.” The upcoming government will be exempt from the strict constraints imposed by the debt brake for the initial two years following their appointment. Nevertheless, after this two-year period, if no consolidation measures are put into action, a significant restriction on public spending will be imposed until the debt is effectively consolidated.

Presidential Election

The presidential election will once again be a battle of new faces, as current President Zuzana Čaputová has announced that she will not seek re-election. This marks an opportunity for former Foreign Minister Ivan Korčok, who was the nominee of the SaS (ECR) party. He is a strong supporter of Slovakia’s European and transatlantic ties and will most likely be supported by the PS and SaS parties. On the other hand, the candidacy of the chairman of the second strongest coalition party Hlas-SD, Peter Pellegrini, the current speaker of parliament and former prime minister, is very likely. It can be expected that the strongest party Smer-SD and probably the last coalition party SNS will support him. Other candidates are likely to intervene in the election, but the main battle should be between these candidates.

European Election

The European elections will be overshadowed by previous elections, and it is to be expected that people will be tired of successive campaigns. Therefore, we do not expect fundamental and strong topics on which voters’ decision-making would break. Rather, they will be a kind of reverberation of the two previous elections, and the results will mainly affect the ability of parties to mobilise their voters. It is also important to point out that PES has suspended the membership of the currently strongest (Smer-SD) and third strongest parties (Hlas-SD), which will of course have an impact on their election campaigns. It can be expected that the second strongest party in the parliamentary elections, the PS (Renew Europe), will campaign actively and strongly pro-European and will be able to mobilise its voters, as they did in the past European elections. It will be interesting to see the performance of the EPP parties – OľaNO and KDH, which traditionally also managed to attract their voters to the polls.

Government reshuffle: The opening act

| By Ayer Mehmet | 0 Comments

When it comes to Cabinet reshuffles, most politicians are well versed in the day’s proceedings. An anxious wait, a scurry to Number 10, a forced smile to the press – regardless of a promotion, demotion, or full-blown defenestration. As some ministers wait to know their fate, few would have woken up this morning and accurately guessed how the day would unfold. Before most had the chance to make a cup of coffee, Rishi Sunak had already rolled the dice on one of the greatest political gambles we’ve seen in recent years.

Westminster has been awash with reshuffle rumours since party conference season. With the Conservatives trailing heavily in the polls – and key events such as the Autumn Statement fast approaching – there was little doubt that Sunak would reshuffle his top team to prepare for the impending general election and once again attempt to reset his fortunes. Plus, with Suella Braverman’s controversial article in The Times critiquing the police without Number 10 approval, the Prime Minister seized his opportunity to stamp his authority on the government machine.

Braverman’s sacking would have no doubt stolen today’s broadsheet headlines if it weren’t for Sunak’s “dead cat strategy” – a Cabinet appointment leaving SW1 in total shock. Enter the stage – David Cameron. The former Prime Minister was this morning created a life peer in order to take up the position of Foreign Secretary, in an attempt to reclaim the centre ground from Labour.

The reshuffle of the great offices of state also raises serious policy dilemmas. The new Home Secretary, James Cleverly has publicly lobbied against Braverman’s decision to place 1,700 asylum seekers on the former RAF Wethersfield, a decision which will now fall under his remit – leaving the Government’s immigration policy here in a somewhat grey area. Meanwhile, only five weeks ago, Cameron was scathing in his criticism of Sunak’s decision to scrap HS2. Coupled with his own premiership denoting a period of closer ties between the UK and China – in stark contrast to this Government’s current position – most will watch with wonder as to how the Government will dutifully line up behind Sunak’s vision and reconcile its differences.

Elsewhere, Liz Truss’ ally and former Deputy Prime Minister Thérèse Coffey has been dismissed as Environment Secretary, while Conservative rising star Laura Trott has been appointed Chief Secretary to the Treasury. Victoria Atkins will be tasked with attempting to cut NHS waiting lists in her new position as Health Secretary, with Steve Barclay taking on the top job at DEFRA. This reshuffle has so far been characterised by bringing Sunak’s friends and allies closer into the tent, while promoting fresh faces that will likely play well in the pre-election media rounds.

As the week continues, we will expect to see further changes at the junior ministerial level. That said, we’ve already had multiple resignations from those who aren’t contesting the next general election– veteran Schools Minister Nick Gibb has left the DfE while Colchester MP Will Quince has stepped down as Minister of State for Health, having announced in the summer his intention not to seek re-election. For others, it presents the chance to refocus their attention onto an electoral footing, doubling down efforts to shore up their slim constituency majorities.

But there will be little chance to dwell on the changes that are being made. Next week’s Autumn Statement will bring home to ministers the challenging fiscal framework they now must work in – and while Chancellor Jeremy Hunt is safe for now, he will be fully aware his day of judgement will come next Wednesday at the despatch box.

The show must go on. Nervous waits will continue, while a few glasses will be raised in quiet celebration amongst those who have climbed the greasy pole. Yet few things in politics are certain – David Cameron’s return emphasises that political destinies are never straight forward, and the stage is constantly set for a triumphant encore, or a crippling opening night.